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COMCAST-NBCU, NETFLIX, AND THE FCC: THE DUAL
MERGER REVIEW PROCESS AS A HOUSE OF CARDS
Matthew J. Razzano*
INTRODUCTION
The year is 2020. The golden age of television persists, but a war for exclusive
content has erupted. HBO has emptied its coffers to produce another season of
Game of Thrones. Netflix has constructed even more lavish sets for The Crown.
And Hulu followed The Handmaid’s Tale with multiple critically acclaimed dramas.
Inundated by the sheer volume of programming, viewers have no choice but to sit
before their television sets (or computers, or tablets, or phones) with glassy-eyed,
expressionless faces and watch.1
But in this not-so-distant future, the problem is too much choice. First,
dwindling profits in its video division prompt Comcast to allow its licensing
agreements with Netflix to expire. Each show now streams exclusively on
Comcast’s proprietary service. Then, Disney follows suit, pulling its ABC shows
from online providers and placing them on its newly developed distribution site.
Soon, the movies shown on FX+ are not available on Amazon, and the shows on
Crackle do not align with those on VUDU. Everyone with exclusive content refuses
to share. Viewers are forced to pay for à la carte subscriptions. To compete with
Comcast, Time Warner purchases a traditional network, but regulators initiate a twoyear investigation. Yet, Netflix attempts to buy Hulu, and federal agencies simply
watch, lacking jurisdiction to treat this merger similarly.
This is the environment emerging under the antiquated telecommunications
regulatory regime. The weight of technological change has crippled a system
designed for telephones and cable—not the internet.
Still, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC or “Commission”), other federal agencies, and
the courts must manage the fallout. While this Essay could discuss a variety of

* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2019; M.Sc., London School of Economics,
2016; B.A., University of Notre Dame, 2012. I would like to thank Professor Patricia Bellia for
her guidance, and the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for their thoughtful editing and
assistance. I would also like to thank my parents for their support, especially my mother for
instilling in me a love of writing. All errors are my own.
1 See generally DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, INFINITE JEST (1996) (centering around a
videotape so engaging that it is used as a weapon, forcing those who watch to lose their ability to
function). Wallace further describes present culture as a “U.S.A. that would die . . . for the socalled perfect Entertainment.” Id. at 318.
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influential transactions, the merger discussed below was critical in introducing many
of the issues now plaguing the industry.
On December 3, 2009, Comcast announced it would acquire the National
Broadcasting Company-Universal (NBCU) from General Electric (GE).2 This
combination fused the largest cable company with a leader in video production. 3
Before the ink dried on the purchase agreement, however, consumer activists and
competitors organized in opposition. Specifically, they feared that non–Comcast
subscribers would lose access to NBCU programming or pay unfair prices for
content.4 Needless to say, the principal telecommunications regulators—the FCC
and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ” or “Department”)—sought review of this
merger.5
The DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) historically split merger
review jurisdiction among industries, but telecommunications transactions are
unique in that both the DOJ and the FCC simultaneously review mergers. 6 Yet,
these twin processes can lead to confusion and inconsistency. 7 For instance, the
DOJ’s review often parallels trends in antitrust theory, 8 taking a more free-market
approach, while the FCC regulates with a heavier hand. 9 These differing agency
attitudes can result in unequal treatment and negative market consequences. 10
On January 18, 2011, the FCC and the DOJ approved the Comcast-NBCU
merger.11 The Commission’s order (the “Order”) underscored Comcast’s ability to
hoard its newly acquired content and to raise prices on competitors.12 For the first
time, however, the FCC examined the online video distributor (OVD) market—

2 See Applications and Pub. Interest Statement of Comcast Corp., Gen. Elec. Co., & NBC
Universal, Inc. at 1, MB Docket No. 10-56 (Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n Jan. 28, 2010).
3 Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video
Programming, Thirteenth Annual Report, 24 FCC Rcd. 542, 550, 555 (2009) [hereinafter FCC
Competition Report].
4 See Tim Arango, G.E. Makes It Official: NBC Will Go to Comcast, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/04/business/media/04nbc.html (describing the deal’s
political tensions).
5 Applications of Comcast Corp., Gen. Elec. Co., & NBC Universal, Inc. for Consent to
Assign Licenses & Transfer Control of Licensees, 26 FCC Rcd. 4238, 4246–47 (2011) [hereinafter
Comcast-NBCU Order].
6 See Rachel E. Barkow & Peter W. Huber, A Tale of Two Agencies: A Comparative
Analysis of FCC and DOJ Review of Telecommunications Mergers, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 29, 29.
7 Id. at 31.
8 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (following
Sylvania—per se illegality of vertical integration is unnecessary); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (moving away from per se vertical merger illegality). See generally
Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J.
ON REG. 171, 188 (2002) (discussing how the Chicago School questioned the need to regulate
vertical mergers).
9 See Barkow & Huber, supra note 6, at 34.
10 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 227 (2d ed. 2001) (“Because there are motives
for mergers unrelated to either monopolistic intent or economies of integration, one cannot be
certain that a series of vertical mergers reflects the existence of substantial economies of vertical
integration . . . .”).
11 See Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4243.
12 Id. at 4250–51.
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Netflix, Hulu, Amazon—as a potential threat to multichannel video programming
distributors (MVPDs) like Comcast.13 Because of this market’s embryonic state, the
FCC felt the merger threatened its development and imposed conditions to ensure
its growth. While the FCC correctly included this burgeoning technology in its
analysis, it failed to accurately process how this market would develop. Like a new
parent, the FCC insulated the nascent OVDs from competition—all but ensuring
their unchecked expansion.
This Essay argues that the FCC inconsistently dissects market trends, and its
costly processes—paired with DOJ review—stymie growth in the
telecommunications industry. Part I traces the history of dual review and compares
the FCC’s procedures with the DOJ’s. Part II evaluates the Comcast-NBCU deal—
its history, the FCC Order, and the conditions imposed. Part III argues that the FCC
is not adept at analyzing telecommunications transactions, and is certainly not adept
at predicting market developments. It then claims that the Comcast-NBCU deal
unearthed serious problems in the dual review process. Specifically, jurisdictional
restrictions facing the FCC limit the types of transactions it can regulate, as
compared to traditional antitrust agencies. Ultimately, this Essay recommends that
the DOJ have sole authority to review mergers because it can apply a consistent
framework to all telecommunications transactions.
I.

THE FCC AND DUAL REVIEW

Created during the New Deal era, the FCC initially sought to make
“available . . . a rapid, efficient . . . wire and radio communication service with
adequate facilities at reasonable charges.”14 This straightforward task expanded
through time to include modern technology.15 Nevertheless, the FCC’s chief duties
still include issuing broadcast licenses16 and ensuring that consumers have access to
telecommunications services.17 One way the agency exercises this latter function is
through merger review.18
The agencies traditionally responsible for this review, the DOJ and the FTC,
derive their authority from a series of antitrust statutes. First, the Sherman Antitrust
Act grants enforcement power to prevent unreasonable “restraint[s] of trade or
commerce,”19 and to prevent “monopoliz[ation].”20 Next, the Clayton Act places

13 Id. at 4267.
14 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at
47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012)).
15 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
16 See 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (outlining license transfer procedures).
17 See id. § 151.
18 Though “public interest” has a broad definition, one goal of its use in the FCC context is
universal consumer coverage. See id. §§ 214, 310 (stating that license transfers must promote “the
public interest, convenience, and necessity”); see also Barkow & Huber, supra note 6, at 34 n.20
(reiterating the source(s) of FCC merger review authority).
19 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (2012)).
20 Id. § 2 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2).
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default merger jurisdiction in the FTC and the DOJ.21 Under this law, both agencies
regulate instances of price discrimination22 and review mergers crossing certain
thresholds.23
Further, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act
establishes premerger notification and filing procedures. 24
Conversely, the Communications Act of 1934 grants the FCC authority to
regulate mergers through the spectrum license transfer process—that is, whether the
“public interest, convenience, and necessity w[ould] be served” in the transfer. 25 In
addition, section 214 gives the Commission authority to regulate “acquisition[s] of
lines by a common carrier” using the public interest standard.26 At the same time,
Congress granted the FTC superfluous jurisdiction to review mergers involving
common carriers under sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act.27 But when the FCC
discusses its jurisdiction, it “invariably notes this authority, then states that it need
not rely upon the Clayton Act because the Commission’s review under the
Communications Act[’s public interest standard] is sufficient.”28 This public interest
standard has been “construed broadly” 29 to grant the Commission wide latitude to
intervene in the industry.
The DOJ and the FTC divide jurisdiction among particular industries to avoid
overlap.30 In telecommunications transactions, however, the FCC is charged with
reviewing mergers that the DOJ also regulates, creating a dual review process with
inconsistent standards.31 The FCC’s process is arduous, while the DOJ’s antitrust
procedures are more straightforward. For instance,
[a]ny DOJ challenge to a proposed merger requires the DOJ to bear the burden
of proving a violation of the antitrust laws. This procedural posture is crucial—
mergers are presumed not to substantially lessen competition absent a contrary
showing. Against this backdrop, the DOJ’s analysis of proposed mergers results
in a predictable standard that allows companies to forecast the benefits of the
32
merger.

21 Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, ch. 323, § 7A, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 18a).
22 15 U.S.C. § 13.
23 Id. § 18a.
24 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 201, 90
Stat. 1383 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a).
25 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (2012).
26 STUART MINOR BENJAMIN & JAMES B. SPETA, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND
POLICY 489 (4th ed. 2015).
27 Clayton Act, ch. 323, §§ 7, 11, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 18, 21(a)) (giving the FCC enforcement jurisdiction over “common carriers”).
28 Barkow & Huber, supra note 6, at 41.
29 William J. Rinner, Comment, Optimizing Dual Agency Review of Telecommunications
Mergers, 118 YALE L.J. 1571, 1574 (2009).
30 See William E. Kovacic, The Institutions of Antitrust Law: How Structure Shapes
Substance, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1019, 1022–26 (2012) (reviewing DANIEL A. CRANE, THE
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT (2011)).
31 See Rinner, supra note 29, at 1577 (“Parties seeking to merge must clear regulatory hurdles
set at different heights—transactions that clear the DOJ’s well-advertised test might compel the
FCC to attach broad-ranging conditions.”).
32 Id. at 1573–74 (footnote omitted).
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Thus, the DOJ fosters free-market principles by blocking only substantially
anticompetitive transactions,33 whereas “the FCC frequently uses merger reviews as
forums for advancing its regulatory agenda.” 34 It accomplishes this by “order[ing]
merging parties to submit to conditions in order to obtain license transfer
approval.”35 And lack of approval ultimately blocks the deal.36
From a procedural standpoint, the DOJ and the FTC can review mergers in any
industry, provided that the transactions are anticompetitive. The FCC’s threshold
for jurisdiction, however, is limited to broadcast license transfers or the acquisition
of wire infrastructure. That said, once the FCC has jurisdiction, it is constrained
only by the broad public interest standard.37 The result: “In adjudications, the
Commission can advance its policies in a way that seems entirely fact-specific,
which leaves it room to retain its position in the next case or to abandon it at will.”38
Not bound by rulemaking’s formalities, the FCC has flexibility to make
unpredictable, nonprecedential decisions.
A final difference is timing. The DOJ process is bound by the Hart-ScottRodino Act,39 where “[n]otification of a proposed merger triggers a thirty-day
waiting period.”40 No action results in implicit acceptance. 41 However, the FCC
faces no such constraint. Only “[a] self-imposed 180-day deadline” exists (though
is rarely adhered to).42 In the end, the FCC’s unclear process may chill investment,
deter mergers, and stymie long-term planning efforts.
At the core of the FCC’s review, however, is the public interest standard. The
Commission “employs a balancing test, weighing any potential public interest harms
of the proposed transaction against any potential public interest benefits.” 43 And it
applies opaque standards like the affected quality of “communications services,”
“technological . . . changes,” and “trends within the communications industry.” 44
Ultimately the applicants “bear the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the proposed transaction, on balance, serves the public interest.” 45

33
34

See Barkow & Huber, supra note 6, at 39.
Id. at 34. See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 330 (1989) (arguing that broadcasters give the FCC a wide
berth by preemptively censoring themselves, fearing that the agency will overregulate otherwise).
35 Barkow & Huber, supra note 6, at 62.
36 See id.
37 See id. at 66; see also BENJAMIN & SPETA, supra note 26, at 491 (“[T]he FCC’s merger
review standards are potentially much broader than the standards applied under the antitrust
laws . . . .”).
38 Barkow & Huber, supra note 6, at 67.
39 See generally Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012)).
40 Rinner, supra note 29, at 1573.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 1574.
43 Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4247.
44 Id. at 4248 (admitting that the FCC’s analysis is “informed by but not limited to traditional
antitrust principles”).
45 Id. at 4247.
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BRAVE NEW WORLD: THE COMCAST-NBCU MERGER

Abstract discussions of dual review are feasible, but a better pedagogical
strategy examines agency processes through the lens of past transactions. Here,
Comcast-NBCU serves as the focal point because it brings into sharp relief many
current issues in the video market.
In 2006, Comcast was the largest cable provider in the Americas.46 Through
the 2000s, Comcast pursued an aggressive growth strategy, most notably in its failed
bid to take over The Walt Disney Corporation for $54.1 billion. 47 But despite its
continued growth, Comcast’s hostile tactics impaired its reputation with
consumers.48
NBC was founded in 1926.49 One of the preeminent networks since inception,
it now houses an array of stations. 50 In 1986, GE took control of NBC, and in 2004
it purchased a majority stake in Universal, forming NBCU.51 This combination
retained the programming wing, but now included Universal’s movie studios and
resorts.52
In December 2009, GE announced a deal to cede control of NBCU to
Comcast.53 Initially, it was structured as a joint venture, where Comcast would
control fifty-one percent, but over time it could purchase the remaining shares for
$30 billion.54 For GE, this was one of several post–financial crisis divestitures to
shift back to its industrial roots.55 For Comcast, NBCU fit within the company’s
46 See FCC Competition Report, supra note 3, at 555–56 & tbl. 2 (showing that, as of June
2006, Comcast, with 21.5 million subscribers, had approximately double the subscribers of its
closest competitor, Time Warner).
47 Geraldine Fabrikant, Comcast Pulls Disney Bid Off the Table, and Wall Street Breathes a
Sigh
of
Relief,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
29,
2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/29/business/comcast-pulls-disney-bid-off-the-table-and-wallstreet-breathes-a-sigh-of-relief.html.
48 See Jennifer Saranow Schultz, The Results of the Worst Company in America Vote, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 30, 2010), https://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/30/the-worst-company-inamerica/; see also Alison Griswold, The Most Hated Merger in America, SLATE (Apr. 24, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2015/04/comcast_time_warner_cable_merger_
why_it_fell_apart.htm (arguing that Comcast’s actions led to negative reactions).
49 Our History, NBCUNIVERSAL, http://www.nbcuniversal.com/our-history (last visited
Sept. 30, 2018).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4244.
53 See David B. Wilkerson & Steve Goldstein, Comcast Scores Controlling Stake in NBC
Universal, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 3, 2009), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/comcast-to-buynbc-stake-as-venture-formed-2009-12-03 (“The long-awaited agreement would give Comcast
control of one the country’s most storied broadcast networks . . . .”).
54 See David Goldman & Julianne Pepitone, GE, Comcast Announce Joint NBC Deal,
CNNMONEY (Dec. 3, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/12/03/news/companies/comcast_nbc/;
see also Press Release, Comcast, Comcast to Acquire Gen. Elec.’s 49% Common Equity
Ownership Interest in NBCUniversal (Feb. 12, 2013), http://corporate.comcast.com/newsinformation/news-feed/comcast-to-acquire-general-electrics-common-equity-ownership-interestin-nbcuniversal.
55 See Press Release, Gen. Elec., GE to Create Simpler, More Valuable Indus. Co. by Selling
Most GE Capital Assets; Potential to Return More Than $90 Billion to Inv’rs Through 2018 in
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growth model,56 creating synergies between proprietary content and its distribution
network.57
The deal was at best met with suspicion,58 and at worst, full-scale opposition.59
Most of the industry remained silent, especially competitor MVPDs, but
programmers feared Comcast would leverage its network to unfairly benefit
NBCU.60 Yet, early commentary indicated begrudging acceptance, as “[m]ost
stakeholders expect[ed] regulators to approve the deal, with conditions attached, by
early [2011].”61
Nevertheless, Comcast endured both FCC and DOJ review, 62 eliciting over
29,000 comments and months of hearings. 63 DISH Network, a distribution
opponent, feared that Comcast would leverage its network to limit customers’ access
to NBCU programming. In their petition to deny, DISH argued that “[t]he merged
Comcast-NBCU would have a greater incentive and ability to discriminate against
competitors in the online video and [MVPD] markets than [did] either company premerger.”64 From a content standpoint, Bloomberg carried the torch in opposition.
At stake was its popular business news service: Bloomberg TV. It argued that
pairing the largest MVPD with one of the largest content providers would uniquely
position Comcast to unfairly “discriminate against BTV to protect [ComcastNBCU].”65 Arguing that news networks must retain objectivity and free-flowing

Dividends,
Buyback
&
Synchrony
Exch.
(Apr.
10,
2015),
https://www.ge.com/sites/default/files/ge_webcast_press_release_04102015_1.pdf
(providing
another example where GE ridded itself of divisions outside its core business).
56 Cf. Paul R. La Monica, Comcast Bids for Disney, CNNMONEY (Feb. 18, 2004),
http://money.cnn.com/2004/02/11/news/companies/comcast_disney/ (discussing the Disney bid).
57 See Press Release, Comcast, Comcast and GE Receive Regulatory Clearance for NBC
Universal Transaction (Jan. 18, 2011), http://corporate.comcast.com/images/Comcast-GERegulatory-Clearance-FINAL-11811.pdf [hereinafter Comcast Regulatory Clearance Press
Release].
58 Brian Stelter, In NBC-Comcast Deal, Quiet Concerns, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/21/business/media/21comcast.html.
59 Joe Flint, Comcast-NBC Universal Merger Draws Criticism, L.A. TIMES (June 22, 2010),
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/22/business/la-fi-ct-fcc-20100622.
60 See id.
61 See Stelter, supra note 58; see also Cecilia Kang, Comcast-NBC Merger Gains Traction,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
24,
2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/12/23/AR2010122305390.html (mentioning that the FCC Chairman
would vote for the merger).
62 See Comcast Regulatory Clearance Press Release, supra note 57; see also Competitive
Impact Statement at 6–7, United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 11-cv-00106, 2011 WL 5402137
(D.D.C.
Sept.
1,
2011)
[hereinafter
Competitive
Impact
Statement],
https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/competitive-impact-statement-72 (commenting on the
coordination between agencies).
63 See Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4246.
64 Petition to Deny of DISH Network L.L.C. and Echostar Corp. at ii, Applications for
Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses Gen. Elec. Co. to Comcast Corp., MB Docket No.
10-56 (Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n June 21, 2010) (stating that Comcast and NBCU showed “a
propensity to leverage its power to thwart competitors”).
65 Petition to Deny at 4, Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses Gen.
Elec. Co. to Comcast Corp., MB Docket No. 10-56 (Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n June 21, 2010).
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information, Bloomberg invoked a purposive reading of the public interest standard
to condemn the deal.66
Yet, when the dust settled, regulators approved the merger and issued separate
opinions describing their respective decisions. 67 This review process, in particular,
fostered “unprecedented” cooperation between the agencies,68 so the conditions
were roughly identical.69 That said, the FCC and the DOJ analyzed the market in
subtly different, but important, ways. Part II discusses the FCC’s analysis of the
programming and distribution markets. Then it briefly compares this analysis to the
DOJ’s. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of the conditions imposed on the
parties.
A. FCC and DOJ Market Analyses
The Commission focused its analysis on two categories: competitive harms to
MVPDs and competitive harms to OVDs.70 The Order acknowledged that “[t]his
transaction would effectuate an unprecedented aggregation of video programming
content.”71 As the largest cable distributor, Comcast could command a “higher price
in negotiations over the terms of arrangements for [NBCU] programming” with
competitor MVPDs.72 Comcast claimed, however, that its new programming
division would only account for approximately thirteen percent of the content
market; thus, the threat against competitor MVPDs was overblown. 73 The FCC
determined, however, that “[t]he record show[ed] that the loss of Comcast-NBCU
programming, including the programming contributed by NBCU, would harm rival
video distributors, reducing their ability or incentive to compete with Comcast for
subscribers.”74
The Commission also evaluated how the Comcast-NBCU merger would affect
the burgeoning OVD market.75 It stated that “[o]ne half of American consumers

66 Id.
67 Eliza Krigman, FCC Approves Comcast-NBC Merger, POLITICO (Jan. 19, 2011),
http://www.politico.com/story/2011/01/fcc-approves-comcast-nbc-merger-047757.
68 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., Justice Dep’t Allows Comcast-NBCU
Joint Venture to Proceed with Conditions (Jan. 18, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-allows-comcast-nbcu-joint-venture-proceed-conditions.
69 Compare Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4240–41 (listing the conditions), with
United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 11-cv-00106, 2011 WL 5402137, at *4–12 (D.D.C. Sept. 1,
2011) (articulating comparable conditions).
70 See Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4250, 4263.
71 Id. at 4240.
72 Id. at 4251 (commenting that Comcast “engaged in foreclosure strategies in the past”); see
also id. at 4258–59 (“In fact, [Comcast-NBCU’s] own documents support the conclusion that some
of the national cable networks combined in this transaction have such loyal viewers that the
transaction will allow Comcast-NBCU to extract higher rents from MVPDs.”); id. at 4255–56
(limiting the market size of MVPDs to cable-related services).
73 Id. at 4252.
74 Id. at 4254; see also id. at 4255 (treating Comcast as the sole owner of this joint venture
with GE).
75 See id. at 4263.
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watch some video over the Internet.”76 Therefore, the FCC wrote that “as a vertically
integrated company, Comcast will have the incentive and ability to hinder
competition from other OVDs.”77 Next, the FCC listed anticompetitive strategies
Comcast might employ to limit OVD growth, including restrictions of “access to or
raising the price of affiliated online content; . . . blocking, degrading, or otherwise
violating open Internet principles[; and] . . . using Comcast set-top boxes to hinder
the delivery of unaffiliated online video.” 78
There was a natural fear that Comcast could withhold content from OVDs, with
the FCC admitting that these services posed a threat to traditional MVPDs.
Commenters responded, arguing that OVDs “already—or soon will—provide viable
commercial alternatives to traditional MVPDs.” 79 Comcast, however, argued that
these online streaming services did not compete directly, but rather were
“supplement[al].”80 The cable provider also stated that OVDs could not stand alone
as profitable businesses because “it is too expensive for OVDs to purchase
professional video from the content owners, who make significantly more money by
selling to the traditional MVPDs.”81 The Commission agreed that “cord-cutting”
rarely occurred and that “most consumers today do not see OVD service as a
substitute for their MVPD service, but as an additional method of viewing
programming.”82 The FCC’s mixed reading shines through. It admits that OVDs
pose a competitive threat, but it couches its analysis in language that fails to describe
these services as legitimate substitutes.
The DOJ released its findings and its final judgment on the same day the FCC
released its Order.83 The conditions were filed in district court, but in accordance
with the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, the Department also considered the
merger’s competitive impact.84 Thus, it simultaneously released a competitive
impact statement (the “Statement”) to assess the industry.
Here, the two agencies drew similar conclusions about the budding OVD
industry. Like the FCC Order, the Statement claimed that “Comcast and other
MVPDs recognize the threat posed to their video distribution business from the
growth of OVDs.”85 And further, it noted that “Comcast’s and other MVPDs’
reactions to the emergence of OVDs demonstrate that they view OVDs as a future
competitive threat.”86

76 Id. at 4264 (claiming that online distribution “figures prominently in the plans of many
MVPDs and other OVDs”).
77 Id. at 4263.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 4267.
80 Id. at 4268. But see MCKINSEY & CO., GLOBAL MEDIA REPORT 5 (2015),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/media-and-entertainment/our-insights/global-media-report2015 (claiming that cord-cutting has become more prevalent).
81 Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4268.
82 Id. at 4269.
83 See Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 62, at 1.
84 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (2012).
85 Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 62, at 19.
86 Id. at 20.
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However, parts of the DOJ analysis revealed a more nuanced understanding of
the online video industry. It claimed that OVDs “represent the most likely prospect
for successful competitive entry into the existing video programming distribution
market.”87 Unlike the FCC, it acknowledged differences in OVD service models,
and that “undoubtedly [some OVDs] will be viewed by consumers as closer
substitutes for MVPD services than others.” 88 Moreover, the DOJ admitted that it
was uncertain as to future market developments. Yet, any technological changes
“would follow standard merger evaluation principles and consider not only the role
of OVDs, but also factors such as the extent to which the merging firms’ offerings
are close substitutes and compete directly.” 89 Therefore, rather than making
unilateral rulings on a case-by-case basis, the DOJ stated it would continue to follow
time-tested antitrust practices. In sum, the FCC had the wherewithal to envision
OVDs as a competitive threat, but it failed to take the next step in analyzing future
developments that might affect the conditions it ultimately imposed.
B. The FCC’s Merger Approval Conditions
The Commission found that Comcast had incentives to withhold NBCU
content from MVPDs, and even though the OVD market was small in 2010, Comcast
believed it could eventually threaten the industry. Therefore, in close coordination,
both the DOJ and the FCC imposed conditions on the Comcast-NBCU merger. This
Section, however, focuses specifically on the FCC Order.
First, the Commission wanted to ensure that other MVPDs had access to
NBCU programming on equal terms. As part of this condition, the FCC adopted an
arbitration process to provide companies access to formal proceedings to “resolv[e]
disputes about prices, terms, and conditions for licensing.”90
Next, the Commission wanted to safeguard OVDs from MVPDs withholding
content.91 It required Comcast to offer NBCU content “at fair market value and nondiscriminatory prices.”92 The cable conglomerate also had to grant OVDs access at
the same nondiscriminatory prices.93 Further, the Commission prevented Comcast
from entering “into agreements to hamper online distribution of its own video
programming or programming of other providers.” 94 To supplement these
conditions, the FCC wanted to guarantee that online providers had access to
87 Id. at 28; see also id. at 17 (imagining OVDs as a threat depends upon factors “such as the
OVD’s ability to obtain popular content, its ability to protect the licensed content from piracy, its
financial strength, and its technical capabilities to deliver high-quality content”).
88 Id. at 17.
89 Id. at 19 (emphasis added). The DOJ competitive impact statement does not quite predict
the current market segmentation among OVDs, but it mentions consumer use of multiple OVDs.
Id. at 18 (“[C]ustomers may rely on an individual OVD or may view video content from a number
of OVDs . . . .”).
90 See Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4241.
91 Id.
92 Id. The Cable Act of 1992 first envisioned vertical integration problems associated with
video distribution. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
93 See Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4241.
94 Id.
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broadband at “reasonable prices and . . . sufficient bandwidth.”95 The underlying
fear in the Order was Comcast’s mountain of exclusive content, and the conditions
ensured “that Comcast not discriminate in video programming distribution.” 96
To shepherd the deal past the regulators, Comcast also agreed to several
voluntary conditions. These included broadband access to low-income households
and assurances that NBCU would provide local news and children’s programming.97
While consumer access to fairly priced content underpinned most of the FCC’s
conditions, these voluntary provisions were meant to directly address consumer
fears.98
III.

RETHINKING THE ROLE OF THE FCC IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS MERGERS

The postmerger commentary was skeptical, yet still optimistic. Opponents
objected to the merger of “programming and distribution when News Corp. acquired
DirecTV in 2003, only to see News Corp. reverse the transaction five short years
later.”99 Additionally, Time Warner spun off its cable business in 2008, creating a
more focused organization.100 These maneuvers suggest that trepidation with
Comcast-NBCU was overblown, but scholars feared “Comcast still sought to slow
down the growth of OVDs until it could transition its customers to its own Internetbased video distribution platform.” 101 Others claimed, however, that “it is hard to
see how [Comcast] could use its control over content to harm competition. To do
so would require the merged company to have a dominant position in content and
the market to be protected by entry barriers.”102 While the Commission lacked the
requisite crystal ball to forecast the future market, the comments above demonstrate
the uncertainty surrounding this transaction.
This Part evaluates the flaws in the FCC’s analysis. It discusses recent market
developments, which are a byproduct of this merger. Next, it argues that dual review
failed the telecommunications industry. Finally, it claims that consumers would
benefit by ceding authority to traditional antitrust agencies.

95 Id.
96 Id. at 4287.
97 Id. at 4242.
98 Id.
99 Christopher S. Yoo, Technological Determinism and Its Discontents, 127 HARV. L. REV.
914, 917 (2014) (reviewing SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRY
AND MONOPOLY POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2013)).
100 Press Release, Time Warner, Time Warner and Time Warner Cable Agree to Separation
(May 21, 2008), http://ir.timewarner.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=70972&p=irol-twcseparation.
101 Yoo, supra note 99, at 933; see also Tom Teodorczuk, Comcast Is Trying to Win Over
Millennials with New Streaming Service, MARKETWATCH (July 28, 2017),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/comcast-is-trying-to-win-over-millennials-with-newstreaming-service-2017-07-27 (targeting millennials with Xfinity Instant TV).
102 Yoo, supra note 99, at 935.
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A. Mistakes in the FCC’s Analysis
The FCC merger review is derived from the public interest language embedded
in the Communications Act,103 which invokes the New Deal–era belief that agencies
deliver nonpolitical expertise.104 While the DOJ and the FTC have proficient merger
procedures,105 the FCC is expected to possess more knowledge about
telecommunications transactions.106 Still, the FCC frequently faces criticism
because of its bloated processes.107
In this instance, the Commission misjudged the progression of the online video
market and protected OVDs to the detriment of MVPDs. The FCC highlighted
commenters claiming “that OVDs need NBCU content to be effective
competitors.”108 At base, Comcast was required to fairly deal with OVDs to ensure
their survival. While it is easy to gloss over this statement, it underpins the
conditions imposed on Comcast and generates a few problematic assumptions. 109
First, it assumes OVDs are limited in the content they can acquire. But NBCU
only constituted approximately thirteen percent of the programming market. 110
OVDs had access to a vast library outside Comcast’s control.111 For instance, when
Netflix created its streaming service, it signed agreements with Viacom112

103
104

See 47 U.S.C. §§ 214, 309(a) (2012).
See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 154–55 (1938); see also GARY
LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 72 (7th ed. 2016) (“The structure of administrative
institutions . . . cannot help but be shaped by the theories of agency behavior that are dominant at
any particular time.”).
105 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(2010) [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES].
106 Cf. BENJAMIN & SPETA, supra note 26, at 487 (discussing the FCC’s power to review
telecommunications mergers and the remedies it can independently impose, distinct from those
remedies imposed by antitrust agencies).
107 See, e.g., Brendan Sasso, The FCC Has the ‘Worst Idea in the History of the Civilized
World!!!!!!’,
ATLANTIC
(Feb.
19,
2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/02/the-fcc-has-the-worst-idea-in-the-historyof-the-civilized-world/457233/ (showing that comments flooded the FCC in response to a rule
allowing cell phones on planes).
108 See Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4268. But see Competitive Impact Statement,
supra note 62, at 11 (emphasizing that growth of OVDs depends, in part, on their ability to acquire
programming from content providers).
109 See MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND SUSTAINING
SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE 8–11 (1985) (outlining the framework for analyzing competitive
markets).
110 Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4252.
111 See Opposition to Petitions to Deny and Response to Comments at 182–84, Applications
of Comcast Corp., Gen. Elec. Co., & NBC Universal, Inc. for Consent to Assign Licenses or
Transfer Control of Licensees, MB Docket No. 10-56 (Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n June 21, 2010)
[hereinafter Comcast Opposition] (arguing that Comcast would not have the market power to limit
OVDs).
112 See Julianne Pepitone, Amazon Prime Scores Viacom Shows After Netflix Deal Expires,
CNN (June 4, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/06/04/technology/amazon-viacom/index.html
(discussing Viacom’s signing with Amazon after the Netflix deal expired).
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(Paramount, MTV, Nickelodeon, et al.) and Disney 113 (Pixar, ABC, ESPN, et al.),
in addition to NBCU.114 The FCC’s assumption only makes sense if other
programmers refused access to OVDs, which at the time rarely occurred. 115
Second, the FCC assumed that OVDs cannot provide original content.116 Yet,
Netflix began spending billions of dollars on shows like House of Cards and Orange
Is the New Black. In the third quarter of 2017, it spent $2.6 billion developing new
programming.117 In addition to this never-ending stream of content, many OVDs
continue to license rerun shows. 118 This creates a steady diet of new and existing
content, illustrating how OVDs can independently present competitive challenges to
MVPDs.
Finally, the statement assumes OVDs will remain dependent upon distributors.
While the FCC opinion notes that OVDs are not purely supplemental, the conditions
assume as much.119 Comcast-NBCU was forced to offer its content at competitive
prices to OVDs.120 Perhaps OVDs were dependent at infancy, but they have now
grown so significantly that they pose challenges to MVPDs. The new Disney service
is the best example of OVD independence, and their ability to operate without the
crutch of cable distribution. Here, the FCC failed to foresee these developments,
and its merger conditions did little to facilitate a competitive market.
B. Video Programming Developments
In the beginning, Netflix and other OVDs licensed network shows, acting as
centralized content hubs.121 Consumers received shows at any time, often under a

113 See Doreen McCallister, Disney Will End Netflix Deal and Offer Its Own Streaming
Services,
NPR
(Aug.
9,
2017),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/08/09/542353743/disney-will-end-netflix-deal-and-offer-its-own-streaming-services
(announcing Disney’s competitor service).
114 See Julianne Pepitone, Netflix Renews Contract for NBCUniversal Movies and TV,
CNNMONEY
(July
13,
2011),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/07/13/technology/netflix_nbc/index.htm (discussing the first deal
between Netflix and NBCU postmerger).
115 Comcast Opposition, supra note 111, at 181–82 (demonstrating Comcast’s belief that the
“combined entity would need to have market power in online video programming content”).
116 Neither the FCC Order nor the DOJ final judgment refer to OVDs potentially producing
original content. See generally United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 11-cv-00106, 2011 WL
5402137 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2011); Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5.
117 See Max A. Cherney, Here’s How to Break Down the Billions Netflix Spends on Original
Movies and Shows, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 18, 2017), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/hownetflix-reveals-the-billions-it-spends-on-content-2017-10-16.
118 See Mark Rogowsky, How Are the Negotiating Dynamics Changing Between Netflix and
the
Movie
/
TV
Studios?,
FORBES
(Jan.
10,
2014),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2014/01/10/how-are-the-negotiating-dynamics-changingbetween-netflix-and-the-movie-tv-studios/#2f94f67f18a3 (arguing that OVD growth increases the
value of licensing agreements).
119 See Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4269.
120 Id. at 4241.
121 See Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 62, at 15–17.
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monthly fee, per transaction fee, or free-with-ads pay structure.122 Networks did not
believe there was “much appetite” for streaming services, so they licensed shows
inexpensively.123 But as streaming became profitable, networks sought to exploit
these licensing agreements.124 As a result, Netflix shifted its focus to original
content; therefore, the “library has become increasingly exclusive.” 125 Amazon
tripled the number of original shows last year,126 while Apple is budgeting one
billion dollars for original content in 2018.127
The breadth of content and the meteoric growth of subscriptions rightfully
worried traditional producers. As Netflix expanded, it utilized its subscription base
to gain leverage over production studios,128 signing exclusive agreements that forced
distribution through Netflix. 129 This created resentment within the industry—so
much so that networks began allowing their licensing agreements to expire. 130 In
turn, many services now produce exclusive content, with limited network
programming.
As a result, studios are searching for new content delivery streams. For
example, FX partnered with Comcast to create FX+: Comcast customers, for a

122 This statement is generally true; however, OVDs operate a variety of business models.
For more information, see id. at 11, 16–17.
123 See Todd VanDerWerff, Why Shows Leave Netflix, VOX (Mar. 30, 2017),
https://www.vox.com/culture/2017/3/30/15114748/why-shows-leave-netflix
(offering
a
descriptive account of this market evolution).
124 See id.; see also David Ng, Netflix Is on the Hook for $20 Billion. Can It Keep Spending
Its Way to Success?, L.A. TIMES (July 29, 2017), http://beta.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fict-netflix-debt-spending-20170729-story.html (arguing that fees continue to increase). To provide
an example, Netflix spent $2 million per episode for Blacklist, a popular show. See Teresa Jue,
Netflix Acquires ‘The Blacklist’ for $2 Million an Episode, ENT. WEEKLY (Aug. 28, 2014),
http://ew.com/article/2014/08/28/netflix-acquires-the-blacklist-for-2-million-per-episode/ (“The
$2 million price tag will be the largest per-episode fee paid by a subscription-based video-ondemand company for a television show.”).
125 Top
Investor
Questions,
NETFLIX,
https://web.archive.org/web/20171116025216/https://ir.netflix.com/faq.cfm (last visited Oct. 14,
2018).
126 See Adam Levy, Amazon’s Content Budget Is Catching Up with Netflix’s (If It Hasn’t
Already), MOTLEY FOOL (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/04/18/amazonscontent-budget-is-catching-up-with-netflix.aspx.
127 See Todd Spangler, Apple Sets $1 Billion Budget for Original TV Shows, Movies (Report),
VARIETY (Aug. 16, 2017), http://variety.com/2017/digital/news/apple-1-billion-original-tv-showsmovies-budget-1202529421/.
128 See Ashley Rodriguez, Netflix and Amazon Are Now So Big That They’re Changing the
Way Global TV Shows Are Financed, QUARTZ (Mar. 29, 2017), https://qz.com/944921/netflixnflx-and-amazon-amzn-are-now-so-big-that-theyre-changing-the-way-global-tv-shows-arefinanced-starting-in-the-uk/.
129 See Lucas Shaw, Netflix’s Biggest Critic Responds with His Own Paid Service,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-25/netflix-sbiggest-critic-responds-with-a-paid-service-of-his-own (expressing anger over the exclusive deal
to license American Crime Story: The People v. O.J. Simpson).
130 See Christopher Palmeri, Disney to Launch Online-Only ESPN, Drops Movie Deal with
Netflix, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0808/disney-to-launch-online-only-espn-drops-movie-deal-with-netflix.
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monthly fee, gain access to FX’s entire catalogue. 131 At the same time, Comcast is
testing its own service to compete with OVDs, called Xfinity Instant TV. 132
Additionally, Disney’s service may alter the market because ESPN streaming would
create the first foray into online sports viewing—not to mention access to their
famed movie studios (Marvel, Lucas Films, Pixar, Walt Disney Studios). 133
The current video world is one of immense competition, and the central-hub
conception of OVDs is in jeopardy. The success of Netflix, Amazon, and Hulu
created a backlash. In an effort to compete, streaming services are now available
through MVPDs, OVDs, and even traditional studios. The theory of “cord-cutting”
was gaining traction,134 but as content went directly online, it created market
segmentation. Consumers once received content in a single location, but now
programmers are becoming possessive of their content. The result is an endless
array of services with little overlap. Now, commentators believe “cord-cutting” will
make little economic sense for consumers, and that overall entertainment bills will
rival the cable bills once complained of—a development contrary to what the FCC
envisioned in its attempt to protect OVDs from Comcast-NBCU.135
C. Dual Review Exposed in the Comcast-NBCU Merger
While other industries work with either the DOJ or the FTC,
telecommunications companies manage two processes simultaneously. Again, the
Commission derives its merger authority from a few statutes. First, the FCC has
authority to review spectrum license transfers or the acquisition of lines by a
common carrier.136 But the “Commission possesses no statutory authority to review
‘mergers’ writ large,”137 because these provisions address only limited aspects of the
industry. And technological advances could limit the FCC’s authority. Still, once
it has jurisdiction, the public interest standard provides wide regulatory discretion. 138
131 See Press Release, Comcast, FX Networks Partners with Comcast to Launch New Serv.
Sept. 5th (Aug. 7, 2017), http://corporate.comcast.com/news-information/news-feed/fx-networksnew-service.
132 See Nelson Granados, Comcast Launches XFinity Instant TV with Entry-Level Video
Bundle;
Will
It
Succeed?,
FORBES
(Sept.
29,
2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nelsongranados/2017/09/29/comcast-goes-over-the-top-withxfinity-instant-tv-will-it-succeed/#4589a497147b.
133 See Press Release, The Walt Disney Co., The Walt Disney Co. to Acquire Majority
Ownership of BAMTech (Aug. 8, 2017), https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/walt-disneycompany-acquire-majority-ownership-bamtech/.
134 See Comcast-NBCU Order, supra note 5, at 4268; see also Jeffrey Prince & Shane
Greenstein, Measuring Consumer Preferences for Video Content Provision via Cord-Cutting
Behavior, 26 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 293, 314 (2017) (arguing that cord-cutting occurs most
often among lower-income households and younger consumers).
135 Todd VanDerWerff, Netflix or Hulu Won’t Win the Streaming Wars. Your Cable Company
Will, VOX (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.vox.com/new-money/2016/10/13/13156848/netflix-huluamazon-cable (“[I]f you subscribed to every streaming service . . . your monthly bill would be more
expensive than an average cable bill on its cheapest tier.”).
136 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 214, 309(a), 310(d) (2012).
137 Applications of Ameritech Corp. & SBC Commc’ns Inc., 14 FCC Rcd. 14712, 15188
(1999) (Comm’r Harold Furchtgott-Roth, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
138 See Rinner, supra note 29, at 1574.
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The DOJ, however, has jurisdiction to review most mergers, but its analysis is
limited to the transaction’s competitive effects.139
In reviewing the FCC’s authority, it is useful to walk through the jurisdictional
issues because they expose its limitations. First, the Communications Act’s license
transfer provisions are unambiguous.140 For example, if two OVDs merged—neither
owning broadcast licenses—the FCC could not review the transaction.141 And no
court could interpret broader review authority from this language.
Second, “common carrier” authority is even more opaque. According to the
Telecommunications Act, “common carrier” is defined as “any person engaged as a
common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio or
interstate or foreign radio transmission of energy.” 142 This unhelpful definition has
become the centerpiece of several U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
decisions addressing FCC authority. Most recently, the “common carrier”
distinction appeared in the open internet debates. In 2010, the D.C. Circuit held that
the FCC had “no express statutory authority” to regulate “an Internet service
provider’s network management practices.”143 The Communications Act granted
the Commission “express and expansive authority to regulate common carrier
services,” but Comcast remained classified as an information services provider. 144
Then in 2014, that same court held that the Commission had authority to regulate
certain internet rules,145 but given that broadband companies were classified as
information service providers, some FCC-promulgated rules were vacated.146 In
2015, however, the FCC reclassified broadband services as common carriers,
subjecting providers to regulation under Title II of the Communications Act. 147
Soon after, this question returned to the D.C. Circuit. The Court held, in rejecting
three separate petitions to reverse the Open Internet Order, that the Commission
made a reasonable decision to reclassify broadband services as telecommunications
services, thus subjecting providers to common carrier regulations. 148 The Court
reiterated: most consumers treat content-containing applications (information
services) and internet providers (telecommunications services) differently. 149 The
Supreme Court has not heard this appeal, but one thing is clear: ad-on applications
(OVDs) are not within the purview of common carrier regulations. 150 While OVDs
139 See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 18, 18a, 21 (2012); see also MERGER GUIDELINES, supra
note 105, at 2–3.
140 47 U.S.C. § 310(d).
141 See id.
142 Id. § 153(11).
143 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
144 Id. at 645; see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 996–97 (2005) (holding the FCC classification of broadband companies as information
services providers as lawful).
145 Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
146 Id. at 650 (“We think it obvious that the Commission would violate the Communications
Act were it to regulate broadband providers as common carriers.”).
147 Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5615–16 (2015).
148 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 697–98 (D.C. Cir. 2016), petition for cert.
filed, No. 17-504 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2017).
149 See id. at 698–700.
150 See id. at 698.
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act as content aggregators, delivering video to consumers, they still require
broadband infrastructure.151 The implication: the FCC has no authority to review
OVD mergers under common carrier rules.
The only other way the FCC might argue it has jurisdiction to regulate
telecommunications mergers is through ancillary jurisdiction. Section 4(i) of the
Communications Act states that “[t]he Commission may perform any and all acts,
make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this
chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.”152 Read broadly, this
might grant the FCC jurisdiction to review mergers beyond its traditional scope, but
the courts have narrowly construed this passage. To qualify for ancillary authority,
the Commission must have jurisdiction under Title I, and the “regulations [must be]
reasonably ancillary to the Commission’s effective performance of its statutorily
mandated responsibilities.”153 In Comcast Corp. v. FCC, the court held that general
policy statements were not sufficient for ancillary authority, and that such authority
required grounding in congressional delegation.154 The Commission could argue
that given the coalescence in the industry, it needs ancillary authority to govern
mergers, but to include OVDs would directly contradict carriage classifications and
previous precedent.155
Thus, the FCC’s merger authority leaves a large portion of the video market
free from scrutiny. For instance, imagine a world where two significant OVDs
merge—say Netflix and Amazon. Neither company has spectrum licenses and
neither is a common carrier. Despite the massive viewership and endless content
libraries, the Commission would have no power to review this merger. If two
traditional networks were to merge however, say ABC and CBS, licenses would
transfer, and the FCC would review the deal. To provide another example, imagine
Comcast purchases Netflix. Again, there would be no transfer of licenses or
infrastructure acquisition because Netflix does not broadcast its content. The FCC
would have no authority to oversee this transaction, despite the impact on
consumers. The irony is that the Commission purposefully protected OVDs and
facilitated their growth; now it would have difficulty regulating them.
This is not to say that these transactions would occur free from scrutiny. Given
the scope of these hypothetical deals, the DOJ would intervene to determine whether
anticompetitive behavior exists. Three serious problems are created, though, in a
world where the FCC has jurisdiction over only a portion of the market. First, the
Commission might regulate mergers in a silo. Without regard to broader market
conditions, it is foreseeable that when the FCC has jurisdiction to regulate a merger,
it will review the transaction in a vacuum. In many respects, this is the approach the
Commission took in Comcast-NBCU. While it scrutinized the OVD and MVPD

151 While OVDs are not broadcasters, they are a better substitute for broadcast television than
cable or broadband providers, given their focus on content production. See FCC v. Midwest Video
Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 702 (1979) (“The Commission is directed explicitly by § 3(h) of the
[Communications] Act not to treat persons engaged in broadcasting as common carriers.”).
152 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2012).
153 Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691–92 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
154 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 654 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
155 See Midwest, 440 U.S. at 702.
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markets, it failed to consider downstream effects. Thus, the ex post developments
discussed above were overlooked.
Second, and more likely, the FCC could regulate mergers too broadly and place
conditions on parties to counterbalance the void in jurisdiction. For instance, if the
FCC were faced with a merger between a distributor and a content provider, it might
implement broader conditions to display its clout because it lacks authority to
regulate OVD-centered transactions.156
And finally, when transactions occur, and the FCC has no jurisdiction, the
Commission might infiltrate the DOJ processes to regulate behind the scenes. Given
the coordination between departments, the FCC could influence the DOJ through
joint merger guidelines and policy statements. While efficiency and coordination
are good, administrative overstep is not. Thus, these trends create regulatory
problems—where MVPDs are overregulated and OVDs are underregulated; they
expose the perils of dual review and the need for reform.
Under these circumstances, it makes sense to leave the merger review process
to the DOJ. While its scope is limited, only reviewing mergers in light of their
competitive effects, it has authority to review all mergers within the
telecommunications industry. Where the FCC has constantly played catch up to
justify its jurisdiction, the DOJ has fewer roadblocks. Given the constantly changing
telecommunications landscape, it makes sense to have a dynamic merger review
process, instead of squeezing technology into antiquated statutes.
CONCLUSION
Despite the problems with dual agency review, the video distribution market
continues to thrive. However, designing a stable process that allows review of all
telecommunications transactions would result in greater consistency. Companies
would plan accordingly when faced with DOJ review, rather than face the cloud of
uncertainty associated with the FCC. Further, as the content and distribution
markets converge, companies desire regulatory consistency to succeed in an
increasingly competitive market. And the DOJ as sole reviewer could best manage
this process to ensure fairness and uniformity.

156 See LANDIS, supra note 104, in FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 104, at 86–
87 (highlighting the natural administrative proclivity toward more regulation).

